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Learnability of an equilibrium with private information

机译:具有私人信息的均衡性的易学性

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This paper investigates the learnability of an equilibrium with private information. Agents of each type have their own private information about an exogenous variable and conduct adaptive learning with a heterogeneously misspecified perceived laws of motion (PLM) that includes only this variable. The paper shows that the existence of private information has a nonnegative impact on the learnability of the equilibrium; that is, the condition for learnability is unaffected or relaxed by heterogeneity and/or misspecification in PLMs caused by private information. In a New Keynesian model with private information about fundamental shocks, the learnability of the equilibrium is ensured by the Taylor principle of monetary policy. The paper also confirms that these results hold true not only in the presence of private information, but also in a variety of informational structures. (C) 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
机译:本文研究了带有私人信息的均衡的可学习性。每种类型的代理都有关于外生变量的自己的私人信息,并使用仅包含此变量的异类错误指定的感知运动定律(PLM)进行自适应学习。本文表明,私人信息的存在对均衡的可学习性具有非负面影响。也就是说,可学习性不受私有信息导致的PLM异质性和/或规格错误的影响或放松。在具有关于基本冲击的私人信息的新凯恩斯主义模型中,均衡的可学习性由货币政策的泰勒原理确保。该论文还证实,这些结果不仅在存在私人信息的情况下适用,而且在各种信息结构中也适用。 (C)2015 Elsevier B.V.保留所有权利。

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