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Fraud, Enforcement Action, and the Role of Corporate Governance: Evidence from China

机译:欺诈,执法行动和公司治理的作用:来自中国的证据

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摘要

We examine enforcement action in China's emerging markets by focusing on (1) the agents that impose this action and (2) the role played by supervisory boards. Using newly available databases, we find that supervisory boards play an active role when Chinese listed companies face enforcement action. Listed firms with larger supervisory boards are more likely to have more severe sanctions imposed upon them by the China Security Regulatory Commission, and listed companies that face more severe enforcement actions have more supervisory board meetings. Our findings are of interest, as supervisory boards in China are generally perceived to be dysfunctional. This study contributes to the existing literature in three ways. First, we shed light on the effects of supervisory boards whose role in a fraud setting has not yet been examined. Second, the study has important policy implications for governance reform. Finally, our analyses provide the most up-to-date picture of fraud and governance issues in China's ever-growing markets.
机译:我们重点研究(1)采取这种行动的代理商和(2)监事会发挥的作用,从而研究中国新兴市场的执法行动。通过使用最新的数据库,我们发现当中国上市公司面临执法行动时,监事会发挥了积极作用。具有较大监事会的上市公司更有可能受到中国安全监督管理委员会的制裁,而面临更严厉执法行动的上市公司将举行更多监事会。我们的发现很有趣,因为中国的监事会通常被认为是功能失调的。这项研究从三个方面为现有文献做出了贡献。首先,我们阐明了监事会在欺诈活动中的作用尚未得到审查的作用。其次,该研究对治理改革具有重要的政策意义。最后,我们的分析提供了中国不断增长的市场中欺诈和治理问题的最新情况。

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