首页> 外文期刊>Journal of Business Ethics >Donate Money, but Whose? An Empirical Study of Ultimate Control Rights, Agency Problems, and Corporate Philanthropy in China
【24h】

Donate Money, but Whose? An Empirical Study of Ultimate Control Rights, Agency Problems, and Corporate Philanthropy in China

机译:捐款,但是谁呢?中国终极控制权,代理问题和公司慈善行为的实证研究

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
       

摘要

Using empirical evidence gathered from Chinese listed companies, this article explores the relationship between micro-governance mechanisms and corporate philanthropy from a corporate governance perspective. In China's emerging market, ultimate controlling shareholders of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are reluctant to donate their assets or resources to charitable organizations; in private enterprises (PEs) marked by more deviation in voting and cash flow rights, such donations tend to be more likely. However, the ultimate controllers in PEs refuse to donate assets or resources they control or own, which implies that corporate philanthropy by PEs comes at the cost of others, through assets or resources owned by minority shareholders. Even after devastating natural disasters such as the 2008 Wenchuan Earthquake, the controlling shareholders continue to express reluctance to donate any assets they control. Despite widespread evidence that corporate philanthropy boosts corporate growth and profitability, these ultimate controllers indicate no intention to donate their own money as a means to improve corporate performance.
机译:本文使用从中国上市公司收集的经验证据,从公司治理的角度探讨了微观治理机制与公司慈善事业之间的关系。在中国的新兴市场中,国有企业的最终控股股东不愿将其资产或资源捐赠给慈善组织。在投票权和现金流量权存在更大偏差的私营企业中,这种捐赠的可能性更大。但是,私募股权公司的最终控制人拒绝捐赠其控制或拥有的资产或资源,这意味着私募股权公司的企业慈善事业是通过少数股东拥有的资产或资源以他人为代价的。即使在经历了2008年汶川地震等自然灾害之后,控股股东仍然表示不愿意捐赠他们控制的任何资产。尽管有广泛的证据表明企业慈善事业可以促进企业增长和盈利,但这些最终控制人表示无意捐出自己的钱来改善企业绩效。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号