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Voluntary Governance Mechanisms in Global Supply Chains: Beyond CSR to a Stakeholder Utility Perspective

机译:全球供应链中的自愿治理机制:从企业社会责任到利益相关者效用的视角

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Poor working conditions remain a serious problem in supplier facilities in developing countries. While previous research has explored this from the developed buyers' side, we examine this phenomenon from the perspective of developing countries' suppliers and subcontractors. Utilizing qualitative data from a major knitwear exporting cluster in India and a stakeholder management lens, we develop a framework that shows how the assumptions of conventional, buyer-driven voluntary governance break down in the dilution of buyer power and in the web of factors rooted in suppliers' traditions, beliefs, local demands and resource dependency. We reveal out how success in governing collaborative global supply chains often falls short within the subcontracting stage, where a stakeholder management mindset is elusive to most participants. We suggest that success in governing collaborative global supply chains is dependent on concepts of stakeholder utility and the presence of shared value that is often at odds with the realities of power, information asymmetry and compliance/reward systems inherent in the non-market coordination of global supply chains. Our findings offer important insights for delineating the concepts of value creation from CSR concepts and practices, and for modifying the basic assumptions of conventional supply chain governance.
机译:恶劣的工作条件仍然是发展中国家供应商设施中的严重问题。虽然先前的研究是从发达的买方方面进行探讨的,但我们从发展中国家的供应商和分包商的角度研究了这种现象。利用来自印度主要针织服装出口集群的定性数据和利益相关者的管理视角,我们开发了一个框架,该框架展示了在买方权力的稀释和根源于网络的因素中,传统的,买方驱动的自愿治理的假设如何被打破。供应商的传统,信念,当地需求和资源依赖性。我们揭示了在分包阶段,治理全球合作供应链的成功往往是不足的,在分包阶段,大多数参与者都无法把握利益相关者的管理思维。我们建议,成功管理全球协作供应链取决于利益相关者效用和共享价值的存在,而共享价值的存在往往与全球非市场协调中固有的权力,信息不对称和合规/报酬系统的现实相矛盾。供应链。我们的发现为从CSR概念和实践中描述价值创造的概念,以及修改常规供应链治理的基本假设提供了重要的见识。

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