Detection of anomalous reactor activity using antineutrino count evolution over the course of a reactor cycle

摘要

This paper analyzes the sensitivity of antineutrino count rate measurements to changes in the fissile content of civil power reactors. Such measurements may be useful in IAEA reactor safeguards applications. We introduce a hypothesis testing procedure to identify statistically significant differences between the antineutrino count rate evolution of a standard "baseline" fuel cycle and that of an anomalous cycle, in which plutonium is removed and replaced with an equivalent fissile worth of uranium. The test would allow an inspector to detect anomalous reactor activity, or to positively confirm that the reactor is operating in a manner consistent with its declared fuel inventory and power level. We show that with a reasonable choice of detector parameters, the test can detect replacement of 82 kg of plutonium in 90 days with 95% probability, while controlling the false positive rate at 5%. We show that some improvement on this level of sensitivity may be obtained by various means, including use of the method in conjunction with existing reactor safeguards methods. We also identify a necessary and sufficient minimum daily antineutrino count rate and a maximum tolerable background rate to achieve the quoted sensitivity, and list examples of detectors in which such rates have been attained.