A Theodicy for Artificial Universes: Moral Considerations on Simulation Hypotheses

摘要

"Simulation hypotheses" are imaginative scenarios that are typically employed in philosophy to speculate on how likely it is that one is currently living within a simulated universe as well as on the possibility for ever discerning whether one does in fact inhabit one. These philosophical questions in particular overshadowed other aspects and potential uses of simulation hypotheses, some of which are foregrounded in this article. More specifically, "A Theodicy for Artificial Universes" focuses on the moral implications of simulation hypotheses with the objective of speculatively answering questions concerning computer simulations such as: If one is indeed living in a computer simulation, what might be its purpose? What aspirations and values could be inferentially attributed to its alleged creators? And would living in a simulated universe affect the value and meaning one attributes to the existence?