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Flying with a net, and without: Preventative devices and self-control

机译:用网络飞行,无:预防装置和自我控制

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Excessive consumption of many vice goods (e.g., alcohol) has both possible immediate (e.g., a drunk-driving crash) and delayed (e.g., liver disease) negative consequences. This research models the consumption choices of a consumer population with heterogeneous impatience and varying degrees of sophistication in conjunction with both immediate and delayed consequences of excessive vice good consumption. We show that even when a preventative device (e.g., a designated driver) that could eliminate the immediate dangers is available for (almost) free, some consumers forgo it in order to try to use the immediate danger as a soft tool to regulate excessive consumption (e.g., "If I know I don't have a designated driver, then I won't drink too much."). Surprisingly, this "flying without a net" is a successful strategy for some consumers, and we quantify when it is likely to be successful versus harmful. This counterintuitive result has many consequences; e.g., public policies that make the provision of preventative devices compulsory could increase consumer welfare under certain conditions but overall are not Pareto-improving. Likewise, advertising campaigns that exaggerate the likelihood of immediate dangers may be welfare decreasing despite their good intentions. In exploring the effect of our model on pricing of preventative device, we find that pricing is not monotonic in the probability of danger. We also show that consumer pessimism about self-regulation can induce consumers to experience a "boomerang effect" of overconsumption in the presence of a preventative device. Overall our research shows that the relationship between prevention and risk is not as simple as might be assumed in standard analyses and that marketers and public policymakers often need to consider the short-term and the long-term risks as well how prone the consumers are to temptation and how sophisticated they are in judging their temptation. (c) 2020 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
机译:许多副货的过度消耗(例如,酒精)可能立即(例如,醉酒驾驶崩溃)和延迟(例如,肝病)负面后果。这项研究模拟了消费者人口的消费选择,具有异质急躁和不同程度的复杂性,与过度副作用的直接和延迟后果相结合。我们表明,即使在(差不多)免费的预防设备(例如,指定的驾驶员)可用于(差不置的危险),一些消费者饲养它,以便尝试使用即时危险作为软工具来规范过量消耗(例如,“如果我知道我没有指定的司机,那么我不会喝太多。”)。令人惊讶的是,这种“没有网的飞行”是一些消费者的成功策略,我们何时量化可能成功与有害。这项反思效果有许多后果;例如,提供预防性设备强制性的公共政策可能会在某些条件下增加消费者福利,但总体而言并不是普通的改善。同样,夸大危险可能性的广告活动可能是福利减少,尽管他们的意图良好。在探索我们对预防装置定价的模型的影响时,我们发现定价在危险概率中没有单调。我们还表明,关于自我监管的消费者悲观可以诱使消费者在存在预防装置存在下过度公共进行过度发射的“助推器效应”。我们的研究表明,预防和风险之间的关系并不像标准分析中的那样简单,并且营销人员和公共政策制定者通常需要考虑短期和长期风险,以及消费者的易受程度的风险诱惑以及他们在判断他们的诱惑方面有多复杂。 (c)2020 Elsevier B.v.保留所有权利。

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