The value of falsity in the Mencius: early confucianism is not consequentialism

摘要

Early pre-Qin Confucian texts are not concerned with analyzing particular elements of a situation or the person as constitutive of moral value. Strong attempts are made in Confucian philosophy to consider as many aspects of the situation or person as possible. Classical Greek philosophy, as represented by Plato and Aristotle, take the opposite approach. These thinkers look for defining essences that determine what is (morally) important about each thing. This approach has been reflected in consequentialist interpretations of Confucianism, resulting in questionable explanations of passages in the Analects and Mencius. In this paper I will argue that these types of readings, while certainly defendable, overlook a unique Confucian perspective on truth and falsity. By viewing situations as a combination of various influential aspects, and as continuous past and future situations, Confucianism provides an alternative to the Platonic notion of truth and its value.