Psychological, Philosophical, and Educational Criticisms of Harry Frankfurt’s Concept of and Views about “Bullshit” in Human Discourse, Discussions, and Exchanges

摘要

Princeton University Press recently published the American moral philosopher Harry Frankfurt’s book On Bullshit, which quickly made the New York Times best seller list. Originally published in the journal Raritan in 1986, Frankfurt’s book has been heralded as an important theoretical development in the study of what he (and society) colloquially refer to as “bullshit.” Frankfurt formally defines BS as a situation where ones inclination and obligation to speak about a topic or concept far exceeds one’s knowledge of the topic, which most certainly has been a rising problem for a number of reasons over the past 20 years. However, Frankfurt’s book, which purports to be a moral victory of sorts, and despite its popularity, is not only severely flawed and outdated from an educational, cognitive, and philosophical perspective, but it is also highly oppressive in several different but very important ways. Because this book and its main arguments are being cited favorably in a number of different academic circles (including the science education community), this paper highlights the limitations and flaws of this book and develops a counter-argument and model of BS that has important implications for science, mathematics, philosophy, and educational theory and research.