Normative roles, conceptual variance, and ardent realism about normativity

摘要

In Choosing Normative Concepts, Eklund considers a 'variance thesis' about our most fundamental (and seemingly most 'authoritative') normative concepts. This thesis raises the threat of an alarming symmetry between different sets of normative concepts. If this symmetry holds, it would be incompatible with 'ardent realism' about normativity. Eklund argues that the ardent realist should appeal to the idea of 'referential normativity' in response to this challenge. I argue that, even if Eklund is right in his core arguments on this front, many other important challenges for ardent realism remain that also stem from the issues about possible variance in normative concepts that he considers. Following this, I introduce further issues about conceptual variance. These are issues that arise within the context of the framework that Eklund proposes the ardent realist use to confront the variance theses he considers. In particular, the issues concern what normative role as such is, as well as, relatedly, which roles associated with a concept (or predicate) get to count as part of its normative role. The upshot is that issues about conceptual variance in normative domains might be even more challenging for the ardent realist to deal with than Eklund argues.