首页> 外文期刊>Inquiry >The Problem of Obligation, the Finite Rational Will, and Kantian Value Realism
【24h】

The Problem of Obligation, the Finite Rational Will, and Kantian Value Realism

机译:义务问题,有限理性意志和康德价值现实主义

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
       

摘要

Robert Stern's Understanding Moral Obligation is a remarkable achievement, representing an original reading of Kant's contribution to modern moral philosophy and the legacy he bequeathed to his later-eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century successors in the German tradition. On Stern's interpretation, it was not the threat to autonomy posed by value realism, but the threat to autonomy posed by the obligatory nature of morality that led Kant to develop his critical moral theory grounded in the concept of the self-legislating moral agent. Accordingly, Stern contends that Kant was a moral realist of sorts, holding certain substantive views that are best characterized as realist commitments about value. In this paper, I raise two central objections to Stern's reading of Kant. The first objection concerns what Stern identifies as Kant's solution to the problem of moral obligation. Whereas Stern sees the distinction between the infinite will and the finite will as resolving the problem of moral obligation, I argue that this distinction merely explains why moral obligations necessarily take the form of imperatives for us imperfect human beings, but does not solve the deeper problem concerning the obligatory nature of morality-why we should take moral norms to be supremely authoritative laws that override all other norms based on our non-moral interests. The second objection addresses Stern's claim that Kantian autonomy is compatible with value realism. Although this is an idea with which many contemporary readers will be sympathetic, I suggest that the textual evidence actually weighs in favor of constructivism.
机译:罗伯特·斯特恩(Robert Stern)的《理解道德义务》是一项非凡的成就,代表了对康德对现代道德哲学的贡献以及他遗留给德国传统的18世纪末和19世纪初继承者的遗产的原始读物。在斯特恩的解释中,不是康德价值现实主义对自治构成威胁,而是道德的义务性质对自治构成了威胁,导致康德发展了以自我立法的道德主体概念为基础的批判道德理论。因此,斯特恩认为,康德是某种道德现实主义者,持有某些最能体现对价值的现实主义承诺的实质性观点。在本文中,我对斯特恩对康德的解读提出了两个主要反对意见。第一个反对意见是斯特恩认为什么是康德对道德义务问题的解决方案。斯特恩认为无限意志和有限意志之间的区别可以解决道德义务问题,但我认为,这种区别仅说明了道德义务为什么对我们不完善的人类而言必然采取强制性的形式,但不能解决更深层次的问题关于道德的强制性-为什么我们应该将道德规范作为具有绝对权威的法律,以基于我们的非道德利益优先于所有其他规范。第二个反对意见是针对斯特恩的主张,即康德式自治与价值现实主义兼容。尽管这是许多当代读者都会同情的想法,但我认为文本证据实际上对建构主义有利。

著录项

  • 来源
    《Inquiry》 |2012年第6期|567-583|共17页
  • 作者

    ANNE MARGARET BAXLEY;

  • 作者单位

    Department of Philosophy, Washington University, Campus Box 1073, St. Louis, MO 63104, USA;

  • 收录信息 美国《科学引文索引》(SCI);
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

  • 入库时间 2022-08-18 02:21:12

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号