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Contract coordination optimization of a multi-power supplier-single dominant grid supply chain in hybrid electricity market

机译:混合电力市场中多电源供应商-单主导电网供应链的合同协调优化

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Purpose In the hybrid electricity market, renewable energy power generator faces the uncertainty of power market demand and the randomness of the renewable energy generation output. In order to improve the grid-connected quantity of green power, the purpose of this paper is to design the pricing mechanism for renewable energy power generator with revenue-sharing contract in a two-stage "multi-single" electricity supply chain which contains a single dominant power retailer and two kinds of power suppliers providing different power energy species. Design/methodology/approach Considering the dual uncertainties of renewable energy power output and power market demand, the authors design the full-cooperative contract decision-making model, wholesale price contract decision-making model and revenue-sharing contract decision-making model to compare and optimize grid-connected pricing in order to maximize profit of different parties in power supply chain. Then, this paper performs a numerical simulation, discusses the existence of the equilibrium analytical solutions to satisfy the supply chain coordination conditions and analyzes the optimal contract parameters' variation characteristics and their interaction relationship. Findings The authors find that the expected profits of the parties in the hybrid power supply chain are concave about their decision variables in each decision-making mode. The revenue-sharing contract can realize the Pareto improvement for all parties' interest of the supply chain, and promote the grid-connected quantity of green power effectively. The grid-connected price will reduce with the increase of revenue-sharing ratio, and this impact will be greater on the renewable energy power. The greater the competition intensity in power supply side, the smaller the revenue-sharing ratio from power purchaser. And for the same rangeability of competition intensity, the revenue-sharing ratio reduction of thermal power is less than that of the green power. The more the government subsidizing green power supplier, the smaller the retailer sharing revenue to it. Practical implications - Facing with the dual uncertainties of green power output and market demand and the competition of thermal power in hybrid electricitymarket, this study can provide a path to solve the problem of renewable energy power grid-connecting. The results can help green power become competitive in hybrid power market under loose regulations. And this paper suggests that the government subsidy policy should be more tactical in order to implement a revenue-sharing contract of the power supply chain. Originality/value This paper studies the renewable energy electricity grid-connected pricing under the uncertainty of power supply and market demand, and compares different contract decision-making strategies in order to achieve the power supply chain coordination. The paper also analyzes the competition between thermal power and renewable energy power in hybrid electricity market.
机译:目的在混合电力市场中,可再生能源发电机面临电力市场需求的不确定性和可再生能源发电输出的随机性。为了提高绿色电力的并网发电量,本文的目的是设计两阶段“多单”电力供应链中具有收益分成合同的可再生能源发电价格机制。单一的主要电力零售商和提供不同电力能源种类的两种电力供应商。设计/方法/方法考虑到可再生能源发电量和电力市场需求的双重不确定性,作者设计了全合作合同决策模型,批发价格合同决策模型和收益分成合同决策模型进行比较。并优化并网定价,以最大化电力供应链中各方的利润。然后,本文进行了数值模拟,讨论了满足供应链协调条件的均衡解析解的存在性,并分析了最优合同参数的变化特征及其相互作用关系。结论作者发现,在每种决策模式中,混合电源供应链中各方的预期利润对于他们的决策变量都是凹入的。收益分成合同可以实现供应链各方利益的帕累托改进,并有效地提升绿色电力的并网数量。并网价格将随着收入分享比率的增加而降低,而对可再生能源的影响将更大。供电方面的竞争强度越大,购电者的收益分享率就越小。在相同的竞争强度范围内,火电的收益分享率降低幅度小于绿色电力。政府对绿色电力供应商的补贴越多,零售商向其分享收入的规模就越小。实际意义-面对绿色电力输出和市场需求的双重不确定性以及混合电力市场中火电的竞争,该研究可为解决可再生能源并网问题提供一条途径。结果可以帮助绿色电力在宽松的法规下在混合动力市场中变得更具竞争力。并且本文建议政府补贴政策应更具策略性,以执行电力供应链的收益共享合同。独创性/价值本文研究了在电力供应和市场需求不确定的情况下可再生能源并网定价,并比较了不同的合同决策策略,以实现电力供应链的协调。本文还分析了混合电力市场中火电和可再生能源之间的竞争。

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