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A Bayesian Game Based Vehicle-to-Vehicle Electricity Trading Scheme for Blockchain-Enabled Internet of Vehicles

机译:基于Bayesian游戏的车辆到车辆电力交易计划,支持了板块的车辆互联网

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摘要

With ever increasing people's awareness of low carbon and environmental protection, electric vehicles are gradually gaining wide popularity. However, the driving endurance of the electric vehicle is the biggest shortage that hinders the fully acceptance of this new vehicle technology. To deal with this shortage, this paper proposed a vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) electricity trading scheme based on Bayesian game pricing in blockchain-enabled Internet of vehicles (BIoV). Specifically, the Bayesian game is adopted for pricing in the distributed BIoV with incomplete information sharing. The optimal pricing under the linear strategic equilibrium has been obtained which maximizes the utilities of both sides of electricity transaction. The transaction volume is determined from the formulated convex problem that maximizes the social welfare. Then, the pricing game is implemented by the dedicated smart contract. Blockchain guarantees its trustworthiness, security, and reliability. Finally, the experimental results show that referring to the benchmark of static game with complete information, the proposed Bayesian game with incomplete information can achieve approximate satisfaction of users. The degree of approximation can reach to 98% when the pricing ranges of buyers and sellers are close. Moreover, the proposed scheme has great advantages over the static game with complete information in terms of communication overhead and timeliness in the decentralized IoVs.
机译:随着人们对低碳和环保的认识,电动汽车逐渐获得广泛。然而,电动汽车的驱动耐力是阻碍这种新的车辆技术的完全验收的最大短缺。要处理这一短缺,本文提出了一种基于贝叶斯博弈定价的车辆到车辆(V2V)电力交易计划,其支持区块链式车辆(BIOV)。具体而言,在分布式BIOV中采用贝叶斯游戏进行了不完整的信息共享。已经获得了线性战略均衡下的最佳定价,最大化了电力交易两侧的公用事业。交易量由制定的凸面问题决定,最大化社会福利。然后,定价游戏由专用的智能合同实施。区块链保证其可靠性,安全性和可靠性。最后,实验结果表明,参考静态游戏的基准与完整的信息,具有不完整信息的提议的贝叶斯游戏可以实现对用户的近似满足。当买家和卖家的定价范围接近时,近似程度可以达到98%。此外,拟议方案在静态游戏中具有很大的优势,在沟通的IOV中的通信开销和及时性方面具有完整的信息。

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