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Monitoring Enterprise DNS Queries for Detecting Data Exfiltration From Internal Hosts

机译:监视企业DNS查询以检测来自内部主机的数据泄漏

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摘要

Enterprise networks constantly face the threat of valuable and sensitive data being stolen by cyber-attackers. Sophisticated attackers are increasingly exploiting the Domain Name System (DNS) service for exfiltrating data as well as maintaining tunneled command and control communications for malware. This is because DNS traffic is usually allowed to pass through enterprise firewalls without deep inspection or state maintenance, thereby providing a covert channel for attackers to encode low volumes of data without fear of detection. This paper develops and evaluates a real-time mechanism for detecting exfiltration and tunneling of data over DNS. Unlike prior solutions that operate off-line or in the network core, ours works in real-time at the enterprise edge. Our first contribution is to collect and analyze real DNS traffic from two organizations (a large University and a mid-sized Government Research Institute) over several days and extract numerous stateless attributes of DNS messages that can distinguish malicious from legitimate queries. Our second contribution is to develop, tune, and train a machine-learning algorithm to detect anomalies in DNS queries using a benign dataset of top rank primary domains. To achieve this, we have used 14 days-worth of DNS traffic from each organization. For our third contribution, we implement our scheme on live 10 Gbps traffic streams from the network borders of the two organizations, inject more than three million malicious DNS queries generated by two exfiltration tools, and show that our solution can identify them with high accuracy. We compare our solution with the two-class classifier used in prior work. We draw insights into anomalous DNS queries of two enterprise networks by their anomaly scores, the trace of query count over time, enterprise hosts querying them, and TTL and Type fields of their corresponding responses. Our tools and datasets are made available to the public for validation and further research.
机译:企业网络不断面临着有价值的敏感数据被网络攻击者窃取的威胁。复杂的攻击者越来越多地利用域名系统(DNS)服务来窃取数据以及维护恶意软件的隧道式命令和控制通信。这是因为通常允许DNS流量通过企业防火墙,而无需进行深入检查或状态维护,从而为攻击者提供了秘密通道,可对少量数据进行编码而无需担心被检测到。本文开发并评估了一种实时机制,用于检测DNS上的数据渗透和隧道传输。与脱机或在网络核心中运行的现有解决方案不同,我们的解决方案可在企业边缘实时工作。我们的第一项贡献是在几天内收集和分析来自两个组织(大型大学和中型政府研究机构)的真实DNS流量,并提取DNS消息的许多无状态属性,这些属性可以区分恶意查询和合法查询。我们的第二个贡献是开发,调整和训练机器学习算法,以使用排名靠前的主域的良性数据集来检测DNS查询中的异常。为此,我们使用了每个组织14天的DNS流量。对于第三项贡献,我们在来自两个组织的网络边界的实时10 Gbps流量流上实施了该方案,注入了由两个渗透工具生成的超过300万个恶意DNS查询,并证明了我们的解决方案可以高精度地对其进行识别。我们将我们的解决方案与先前工作中使用的两类分类器进行比较。我们通过两个企业网络的异常分数,随时间的查询计数跟踪,企业主机对其进行查询以及它们相应响应的TTL和类型字段来深入了解两个企业网络的DNS异常查询。我们的工具和数据集已公开提供给验证和进一步研究。

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