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Seeing Meaning: Frege and Derrida on Ideality and the Limits of Husserlian Intuitionism

机译:看到的意义:弗雷格和德里达论理想与胡塞尔直觉主义的局限性

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The article seeks to challenge the standard accounts of how to view the difference between Husserl and Frege on the nature of ideal objects and meanings. It does so partly by using Derrida’s deconstructive reading of Husserl to open up a critical space where the two approaches can be confronted in a new way. Frege’s criticism of Husserl’s philosophy of mathematics (that it was essentially psychologistic) was partly overcome by the program of transcendental phenomenology. But the original challenge to the prospect of a fulfilled intuition of idealities remained and was in fact encountered again from within the transcendental analysis by Husserl himself in his last writings on geometry and language. According to the two standard and conflicting accounts, Husserl either changed his earlier psychologistic program as a result of Frege’s criticism, or he was in fact never challenged by it in the first place. The article shows instead how Husserl continued to struggle with the problem of the constitution of ideal objects, and how his quest led him to a point where his analyses anticipate a more dialectical and deconstructive conclusion, eventually made explicit by Derrida. It also shows not only how this development constitutes a philosophical continuity from the original dispute with Frege, but also how Frege’s critique in a certain respect could be read as an anticipation of Derrida’s deconstructive elaboration of Husserl’s phenomenology.
机译:本文试图挑战有关如何看待胡塞尔与弗雷格在理想客体和意义上的区别的标准论述。这样做的部分原因是使用德里达对胡塞尔的解构性解读来打开一个关键的空间,在该空间中,两种方法都可以以新的方式面对。弗雷格对胡塞尔的数学哲学的批评(本质上是心理学的)被先验现象学的计划部分地克服了。但是,对于实现理想直觉的前景的最初挑战仍然存在,实际上,在侯赛尔本人最后关于几何学和语言的著作中,他的超验分析也再次遇到了这一挑战。根据这两个标准且相互矛盾的说法,胡塞尔要么因弗雷格的批评而改变了他较早的心理学程序,要么实际上他从未受到这一挑战。文章反而显示了胡塞尔如何继续与理想物体的构成问题作斗争,以及他的追求如何使他达到了这样一个点,即他的分析预期到了一个更辩证和更具破坏性的结论,最终由德里达提出。它不仅显示了这种发展如何构成了与弗雷格最初的争执的哲学上的连续性,而且还表明了弗雷格在某种程度上的批评可以被理解为对德里达对胡塞尔现象学的解构性阐述的一种预期。

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