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Two-stage game theoretical framework for IaaS market share dynamics

机译:IaaS市场份额动态的两阶段博弈理论框架

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In this paper, we consider the problem of cloud market share among Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) providers in a competitive setting. The public cloud market is dominated by few large providers, which prevents a healthy competition that would benefit the end-users. We argue that to make the cloud market more competitive, new providers, even small ones, should be able to inter this market and find a share. This problem of deeply analyzing the cloud market and providing new players with mechanisms allowing them to have a market share has not been addressed yet. In fact, to make the cloud market open and increase the cloud service demand, we show in this paper that the cloud providers have to compete not only over price, but also quality. Most of the research performed in the cloud market competition focus only on pricing mechanisms, neglecting thus the cloud service quality and user's satisfaction. However, to be consistent with the new era of cloud computing, Cloud 2.0, providers have to focus on providing value to businesses and offer higher quality services. As a solution to the aforementioned problem, we propose a conceptual, user-centric game theoretical framework that includes a two-stage game: 1) to capture the user demand preferences (optimal capacity and price), a Stackelberg game is used where IaaS providers are leaders and IaaS users are followers; and 2) to enhance the service ratings given by users in order to improve the provider position in the market and increase the future users' demand, a differential game is proposed, which allows IaaS providers to compete over service quality (e.g., QoS, scalability and adding extra features). The proposebi two-stage game model allows the new IaaS providers, even if they are small, to have a share in the market and increase user's satisfaction through providing high quality and added-value services. To validate the theoretical analysis, experimental results are conducted using a real-world cloud service quality feedback, collected by the CloudArmor project. This research reveals that due to the fact that service customization tends to enhance the customers loyalty in today's subscription cloud economy, the best strategy for small IaaS providers is to increase the service cost and improve the quality of their added-value solutions to prevent customers' defection. This not only elevates the provider's profit, but also increases the quality equilibrium that leads to a higher user satisfaction. Consequently, higher satisfaction enhances the provider's rating and future users demand. (C) 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
机译:在本文中,我们考虑了竞争环境下基础架构即服务(IaaS)提供商之间的云市场份额问题。公共云市场由少数大型提供商主导,这阻碍了有益于最终用户的健康竞争。我们认为,为了提高云市场的竞争力,即使是小型提供商,新的提供商也应能够参与该市场并找到份额。深入分析云市场并为新参与者提供允许他们拥有市场份额的机制的问题尚未解决。实际上,为了使云市场开放并增加云服务需求,我们在本文中表明,云提供商不仅要在价格上竞争,而且还要在质量上竞争。在云市场竞争中进行的大多数研究仅关注定价机制,因此忽略了云服务质量和用户满意度。但是,为了与云计算新时代Cloud 2.0保持一致,提供商必须专注于为企业提供价值并提供更高质量的服务。为了解决上述问题,我们提出了一个概念性的,以用户为中心的博弈理论框架,其中包括一个两阶段博弈:1)捕获用户需求偏好(最佳容量和价格),在IaaS提供商使用Stackelberg游戏的情况下是领导者,IaaS用户是关注者; 2)为了提高用户提供的服务等级,以改善提供商在市场上的地位并增加未来用户的需求,提出了一种差分游戏,该游戏允许IaaS提供商在服务质量(例如QoS,可伸缩性)上竞争并添加其他功能)。 proposalbi两阶段游戏模型允许新的IaaS提供商(即使规模很小)也可以通过提供高质量和增值服务在市场上占有一席之地,并提高用户的满意度。为了验证理论分析,使用CloudArmor项目收集的真实云服务质量反馈进行了实验结果。这项研究表明,由于在当今的订阅云经济中服务定制往往会增强客户忠诚度,因此,小型IaaS提供商的最佳策略是增加服务成本并提高其增值解决方案的质量,以防止客户的购买行为。叛逃。这不仅提高了提供商的利润,而且还提高了质量平衡,从而提高了用户满意度。因此,更高的满意度提高了提供商的评分和未来用户的需求。 (C)2019 Elsevier B.V.保留所有权利。

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