Genetic Integrity, Conservation Biology and the Ethics of Non-intervention

摘要

Yasha Rohwer and Emma Marris (in this issue) argue there is no prima facie duty to preserve genetic integrity; they contend, rather, that preserving the integrity of specific genomes is only a means to other ends, such as (1) ensuring species flourishing, (2) avoiding extinction and (3) enhancing biodiversity. Against this perspective, we contend that this prima facie duty exists and that it can be grounded in two different ethically significant relations: the relation between humans and other species and the relationship between present and future humans. Specifically, we follow the reasoning of the ethicist W.D. Ross to argue that the negative conclusion reached by the authors rests on a problematic understanding of prima facie duties. We, the authors fail to recognize that a prima facie duty can be systematically trumped by other duties without thereby losing its status as a prima facie obligation. By denying that we have any ethical duty to preserve the integrity of other species' genomes, moreover, the target article's argument would put conservationists in the position of being unable to sustain ethical arguments against what we refer to as 'willy-nilly' genetic interventionism.