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Phenomenology And The Problem Of Animal Minds

机译:现象学与动物心理问题

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Attempts to determine whether nonhuman animals have minds are often thought to raise a particular sceptical concern; I call it the problem of animal minds. If there are such things as animal minds, the sceptic reasons, they will be private realms to which we humans do not have direct epistemological access. So how could one ever know for certain that animals are not mindless mechanisms? In this paper I use a phenomenological approach to show that this familiar sceptical problem presupposes an account of our relations with others which is both too individualistic and too 'mentalistic' to shed interpretative light on our relations with animals. I conclude that although inquiries into how animals experience the world raise a host of difficult problems, they do not raise one big problem, the problem of animal minds, which must be solved before any such inquiries can get off the ground.
机译:人们通常认为试图确定非人类动物是否具有思维能力引起了特别的怀疑。我称它为动物思想的问题。如果存在诸如动物思想,怀疑之类的事物,它们将是我们人类没有直接认识论途径的私人领域。那么,人们怎么能确定动物不是无意识的机制呢?在本文中,我使用现象学的方法表明,这个熟悉的怀疑性问题以对我们与他人的关系为前提,这种关系既过于个人主义又过于“精神主义”,无法为我们与动物的关系提供解释性的解释。我得出的结论是,尽管对动物如何体验世界的询问带来了许多难题,但它们并没有提出一个大的问题,即动物思想问题,必须先解决这些问题,然后才能进行此类询问。

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