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A Commentary on Pokropski's Functionalist Reading of Husserlian Phenomenology

机译:关于Pokropski功能读数的霍塞尔伦代现象学评论

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摘要

In his recent study, Pokropski argues that Dreyfus’s famous (or infamous) cognitivist readingof Husserl’s theory of mind is partly misleading, specifically, as a strong computationalism. Thestrong computationalist reading of Husserl, according to Pokropski (2020, p. 871), holds that(1) the theory of noema is a sort of adumbration of contemporary computationalism, such asFodor’s representational theory of mind (RTM); (2) this mean, however, that the noema functionsas a mediatory entity (just as Fodor’s mental representations); finally, (3) the noema (or mentalrepresentations) do not require a mind’s physical realization. Pokropski follows McIntyre in arguingthat the strong computationalist reading of Husserl’s phenomenology is implausible. In this regard,Pokropski’s arguments reflect the on-going polemic in the literature (e.g., Drummond, 1990, 2012;Zahavi, 2004, 2017; Szanto, 2012; P?otka, 2017). Yet, Pokropski’s original idea and his key insighthere is to develop an alternative functionalist reading of Husserl’s phenomenology. He holdsthat Husserl applies an explanatory strategy of decomposition which resembles the method offunctionalism. To show this, Pokropski analyzes Husserl’s project of phenomenological psychologywhich seems to address these claims. In the end, he argues that the project allows a non-reductivenaturalization of phenomenology.
机译:在最近的一项研究中,Pokropski辩称,德雷福斯的着名(或臭名昭着)的认知主义读物读物的心理理论是部分误导,特别是作为一个强大的计算主义。根据Pokropski(2020,第871页)的说法,Husserl的TheStrong计算主义读数,持有(1)Noema理论是当代计算主义的一种教育,如Fodor的思想理论(RTM); (2)这意味着,Noema功能是介质实体(就像福戈的心理表现);最后,(3)Noema(或MentalEpresentations)不需要思想的身体实现。 Pokropski遵循McIntyre在Arguingthat中,令人难以置信的是Husserl现象学的强大计算主义阅读。在这方面,Pokropski的论点反映了文学中的持续媒体(例如,德拉姆顿,1990年,2012年; Zahavi,2004,2017; Szanto,2012; p?otka,2017)。然而,Pokropski的原始想法和他的关键insighere是开发出替代职能读取Husserl现象学的读书。 HE HOTLSTHAT HUSSERL应用了一种分解的解释性策略,其类似于该方法的功能性。为了表明这一点,Pokropski分析了Husserl的现象学精神病项目似乎解决了这些索赔。最后,他认为该项目允许非减排的现象学。

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