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Editorial: Epistemic Feelings: Phenomenology, Implementation, and Role in Cognition

机译:社论:认知情绪:认知的现象学,实施和角色

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Epistemic feelings, including feelings of familiarity, knowledge, belief, confidence, doubt,confusion, curiosity, agency, ownership, and many others, are ubiquitous components of humanexperience (Arango-Mu?oz, 2014; Proust, 2015). Such feelings are distinct from canonicalemotions, yet appear to play similar motivational and regulative roles in cognition, particularlyin deliberative, reportable, “process-2” cognition (Evans, 2008; Evans and Stanovich, 2013; seeMelnikoff and Bargh, 2018 for criticism of the dual-process distinction). They are the experiencedand reportable “propositional attitudes” of folk psychology and pre-computational cognitiverepresentationalism (Fodor, 1978).
机译:认知情绪,包括熟悉的感觉,知识,信仰,信心,怀疑,混乱,好奇心,代理,所有权以及许多人都是人类经验的无处不在的组成部分(Arango-Mu?oz,2014;普鲁斯特,2015)。 这种感受与Canonicalemotions不同,似乎在认知中起着类似的励志和调节作用,尤其是审议,可报告的“进程-2”认知(埃文斯,2008;埃文斯和斯坦诺伊州,2013;普通和巴格,2018年批评 双程区别)。 他们是民间心理学和普雷斯特举行的COGNITIVEREPRESENTIONICS(FODOR,1978年)的经验丰富的有关的“命题态度”。

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