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Regular matters: credibility determination and the institutional habitus in a Swiss asylum office

机译:定期事项:瑞士庇护办公室的信誉确定和机构习惯

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This article seeks to understand a common and regular feature of asylum decision-making, namely, that the majority of asylum claims are rejected, mostly on the basis of non-credibility. It draws on a bottom-up, qualitative study of an administration in which asylum decision-making takes place: the Swiss Secretariat for Migration. By adopting a practice-theoretical approach to administrative work, it advocates paying attention to caseworkers’ routinised, self-evident and largely unquestioned behaviours, not only in terms of what they do, but also of what they think, feel and know. Building on Bourdieu, it introduces the concept of institutional habitus, which refers to the dispositions caseworkers develop on the job. On the basis of a specific decision-making practice termed ‘digging deep’, the article shows how these dispositions are structured and how, through the practices institutional habitus generates, these ‘structuring structures’ are continuously reaffirmed, leading to the relatively stable outcomes of administrative decision-making that can be observed from the outside. The article argues against the assumption that regularities of administrative work should be understood as the outcome of strict rule-following, top-down orders and political instrumentalism. At the same time, it challenges the individualist quality sometimes ascribed to discretionary practices in street-level bureaucracy literature and in critiques of credibility assessment practices in asylum adjudication.
机译:本文旨在了解庇护决策的共同和常规特征,即,大多数庇护索赔被拒绝,主要是在不可信任的基础上。它借鉴了对庇护决策的管理的自下而上的,定性研究:瑞士秘书处迁移。通过采用行政工作的实践理论方法,它倡导关注案例工人的常规,不言而喻的,很大程度上是不受欢迎的行为,而不仅仅是在他们所做的方面,而且还有他们的想法,感受和知道。建立在Bourdieu,它介绍了机构习惯的概念,这是指案件工作者在工作中发展。根据“挖掘”的特定决策实践,文章展示了这些处置如何构成结构以及如何通过实践机构习惯产生,这些“结构化结构”是不断重申的,导致相对稳定的结果可以从外部观察的行政决策。本文争辩说,假设行政工作的规律应理解为严格规则的结果,自上而下的订单和政治工具主义。与此同时,它挑战个人主义质量有时归因于街道级官僚文学中的酌情惯例以及庇护批判性评估实践的批评。

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