首页> 外文期刊>Journal of Chinese Sociology >Natural resources, rent dependence, and public goods provision in China: evidence from Shanxi’s county-level governments
【24h】

Natural resources, rent dependence, and public goods provision in China: evidence from Shanxi’s county-level governments

机译:中国的自然资源,租金依赖性和公共物品供给:山西县级政府的证据

获取原文
       

摘要

Abstract This paper investigates how natural-resource endowments affect the provision of local public goods in China. According to fiscal sociology, due to the rentier effect, resource-rich local governments tend to have more state autonomy and are less responsive to society, resulting in poor governance. Moreover, due to political myopia, resource-abundant local governments tend to neglect the accumulation of human capital. Shanxi’s county-level governments are excellent samples to test these hypotheses. Statistical results show that resource-abundant local governments tend to spend less on social expenditures as well as specific education, social security and healthcare, and environmental protection expenditures. Meanwhile, coal-rich governments spend significantly more on self-serving administrative expenditures. The results suggest that negative impacts of natural resources on governmental fiscal extraction and expenditure behaviors are an important causal mechanism of the resource-curse hypothesis. To curb this problem, the current fiscal system needs to be reformed accordingly.
机译:摘要本文研究了自然资源end赋如何影响中国当地公共产品的供给。根据财政社会学的观点,由于食堂效应,资源丰富的地方政府往往具有更大的州自治权,对社会的反应也较弱,从而导致治理不善。此外,由于政治上的近视,资源丰富的地方政府往往忽略了人力资本的积累。山西的县级政府是检验这些假设的绝好样本。统计结果表明,资源丰富的地方政府倾向于在社会支出以及特殊教育,社会保障和医疗保健以及环境保护方面的支出减少。同时,煤炭资源丰富的政府在自助服务上的支出也大大增加。结果表明,自然资源对政府财政收支行为的负面影响是资源诅咒假说的重要成因机制。为了解决这个问题,需要对当前的财政制度进行相应的改革。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号