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The allocation mechanism of authority and accountability in Chinese government hierarchies: A case study of the 'Earmarked Project System

机译:中国政府层级中权力和责任的分配机制-以“专项项目制度”为例

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Abstract Based on basic organizational theories, this paper revisits studies about intergovernmental relationships in China and proposes a systematic explanation framework from the perspective of the allocation mechanism of authority and accountability. The institutional feature of government organization is unfolded from two dimensions, authority and accountability. In China, the authority and accountability of different hierarchies are strongly related but not clearly defined. Theories such as “Federalism, Chinese Style” are the basis for different conditions. The trade-off between control and incentive, specification, and coordination should be given more consideration with optimal analyses. As the main accountability practicing mechanism, Cadre management from upper-layer hierarchies greatly affects the allocation mechanism between different hierarchies. However, the tournament theory about promotion lacks vision, empirical bases, and explanation power. This paper studies the project system from an organizational perspective and indicates that the subcontracting form differs from regional decentralization, which accentuates interdepartmental competition and expansion.
机译:摘要本文基于基本的组织理论,回顾了有关中国政府间关系的研究,并从权力和责任的分配机制的角度提出了系统的解释框架。政府组织的机构特征从权威和问责制两个维度展现出来。在中国,不同层次的权限和问责制密切相关,但没有明确定义。 “联邦制,中国式”等理论是不同条件的基础。控制和激励,规范和协调之间的权衡应通过最佳分析得到更多考虑。作为主要的问责实践机制,高层层次的干部管理极大地影响了不同层次之间的分配机制。但是,关于晋升的比赛理论缺乏远见,经验基础和解释力。本文从组织的角度研究了项目系统,并指出分包形式与区域分权不同,分权形式加剧了部门间的竞争和扩张。

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