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Game Theoretic Analysis of Carbon Emission Reduction and Sales Promotion in Dyadic Supply Chain in Presence of Consumers’ Low-Carbon Awareness

机译:消费者低碳意识下二元供应链碳减排与促销的博弈分析

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The paper studies how the combination of the manufacturer’s carbon emission reduction and the retailer’s emission reduction relevant promotion impacts the performances of a dyadic supply chain in low-carbon environment. We consider three typical scenarios, that is, centralized and decentralized without or with side-payment. We compare measures of supply chain performances, such as profitabilities, emission reduction efficiencies, and effectiveness, in these scenarios. To improve chain-wide performances, a new side-payment contract is designed to coordinate the supply chain and numerical experiments are also conducted. We find the following. (1) In decentralized setting, the retailer will provide emission cutting allowance to the manufacturer only if their unit product profit margin is higher enough than the manufacturer’s, and the emission reduction level of per unit product is a monotonically increasing function with respect to the cost pooling proportion provided by the retailer; (2) the new side-payment contract can coordinate the dyadic supply chain successfully due to its integrating sales promotion effort and emission reduction input, which results in system pareto optimality under decentralized individual rationality but achieves a collective rationality effect in the centralized setting; (3) when without external force’s regulation, consumers’ low-carbon awareness is to enhance consumers’ utility and decrease profits of supply chain firms.
机译:该论文研究了制造商的碳减排量与零售商的碳减排量相关促销措施的结合如何影响低碳环境中二元供应链的绩效。我们考虑了三种典型的情况,即不带或带有附带付款的集中式和分散式方案。在这些情况下,我们比较了供应链绩效的度量,例如获利能力,减排效率和有效性。为了提高整个链的绩效,设计了新的边际支付合同来协调供应链,并进行了数值实验。我们发现以下内容。 (1)在分散式环境中,只有当他们的单位产品利润率足够高于制造商的利润,并且每单位产品的减排水平是相对于成本单调增加的功能时,零售商才会向制造商提供减排量补贴零售商提供的合并比例; (2)新的边际支付合同通过整合销售促进工作和减排投入,可以成功地协调二进式供应链,在分散的个人理性下导致系统最优,而在集中化环境下达到集体理性效果; (3)在没有外部力量约束的情况下,消费者的低碳意识是增强消费者的效用并降低供应链公司的利润。

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