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Mixed Channel OEM Supply Chain Pricing and Service Competition Strategy Considering Brand Dealer Penalties

机译:考虑品牌经销商惩罚的混合渠道OEM供应链定价和服务竞争策略

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The paper constructs a mixed channel OEM supply chain model consisting of brand dealer and manufacturer, with brand dealer acting as the main parties of Stackelberg and manufacturer as the subordinate. This paper compares the profit changes of the supply chain in three situations: single brand channel, the mixed dual channel after the manufacturer opens the direct channel and dual channels where brand dealer penalize manufacturer for direct sales channels. The research results prove that the introduction of direct sales channels by manufacturer can enhance the advantages of the game and gain more profits. Under certain conditions, brand dealer would also benefit from the introduction of direct sales channels, so as to achieve a win-win result. When brand dealers’ profits are infringed, brand dealer can reduce the losses caused by direct sales channels by punishing direct sales channels. What’s more, the better the direct channel acceptance, the better the effect of the method. The total profit of the supply chain is reduced with the increase of the direct channel acceptance.
机译:本文构建了由品牌经销商和制造商组成的混合渠道OEM供应链模型,其中品牌经销商为Stackelberg的主要参与者,制造商为从属。本文在三种情况下比较了供应链的利润变化:单一品牌渠道,制造商打开直接渠道后的混合双渠道以及品牌经销商对制造商惩罚直销渠道的双重渠道。研究结果证明,制造商引入直销渠道可以增强游戏的优势并获得更多利润。在一定条件下,品牌经销商还将受益于直销渠道的引入,从而达到双赢的效果。当品牌经销商的利润受到侵犯时,品牌经销商可以通过惩罚直销渠道来减少直销渠道造成的损失。而且,直接渠道接受度越好,该方法的效果越好。随着直接渠道接受度的增加,供应链的总利润减少。

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