The Mau Mau Emergency as Part of the British Army's Post-War Counter-Insurgency Experience

摘要

This article has analysed the four central components of British Army counter-insurgency in the context of its operations in Kenya from 1952 to 1960. First, although operations were conducted within a legal framework deriving from the common law tradition, the extent of the powers granted to the government under emergency regulations seriously compromised the law's integrity. The regulations resulted in a "sham legalism" whereby basic rights and international law were easily sidelined. Second, there is no doubt that the related minimum force concept was important in the British Army and widely understood. In Kenya, however, policies such as Prohibited Areas, collective punishment and "nipping trouble in the bud" plainly contradicted the concept. This is because the concept was in fact more arbitrary and subjectively interpreted than normally allowed for. The doctrine allowed for a greater degree of force in the colonies and almost any degree of force during insurrections. Minimum force did not prevail as often as is claimed; intimidation of the population, summary executions, torture and unrestrained violence were prevalent for at least eight months.