Human nature and virtue in Mencius and Xunzi: An Aristotelian interpretation

摘要

Given the substantial amount of ink that has been poured over the issue ofrnhuman nature in Xunzi ~ and Mencius ~q~, it might appear to be recklessrneven to think that there is anything new to say about it .1 Nevertheless, motivatedrnby the following three perplexities, I venture to revisit this age-old controversy.rnFirst, I note that, whereas the goodness and evilness of human naturernhas been such a dominant theme in Chinese philosophy, it does not exciternmuch interest in Aristotle and other Greek philosophers. What does this contrastrnsuggest? Second, historically, Xunzi's challenge fails and this becomes onernof the reasons that he was excluded from mainstream Confucianism after thernHan Dynasty. Mencius, in contrast, comes to define the orthodoxy of Confucianism.rnYet, in contemporary scholarship, the table is turned. Mencius' positionrnhas usually been thought to be naively optimistic and lacking empiricalrnsupport. Xunzi's view, on the contrary, is thought to be realistic and close tornthe prevailing Western view that humans axe by nature egoistic. 2 If this is true,rnwhat is the philosophical value of Mencius' position in contemporary ethics?