Rational constraints and the Simple View

摘要

According to the Simple View of intentional action, I have intentionallynswitched on the light only if I intended to switch on the light. The ideanthat intending to ’ is necessary for intentionally ’-ing has been challengednby Bratman (1984, 1987) with a counter-example in which a videogamenplayer is trying to hit either of two targets while knowing that she cannotnhit both targets. When a target is hit, the game finishes. And if both targetsnare about to be hit simultaneously, the game shuts down. The player knowsnthat she cannot hit both targets, but still she concludes that, given her skills,nthe best strategy is to have a go at each target at the same time. Suppose shenhits target 1. It seems obvious that she has hit target 1 intentionally. But,nBratman argues, she could not have intended to hit target 1. Since the scen-nario is perfectly symmetrical, had the player intended to hit target 1, shenwould have also had to intend to hit target 2. But the player knows thatnshe cannot hit both targets.