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The Agency Relationship in Churches: An Empirical Analysis

机译:教会的代理人关系:一项实证分析

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The agency relationship has been observed in a variety of settings. Churches, like other organizations, are plagued with the typical agency problems of moral hazard, observability, goal displacement, and risk aversion. How do churches cope with these issues in dealing with their most critical resource, clergy? This study analyzes the agency relationship between churches and their clergy. Using data from nine denominations, this study finds strong evidence that pastor compensation is not tied directly to performance, but rather indirectly through promotion tournaments. Successful pastors are rewarded by being called to larger, presumably wealthier and more prestigious, congregations. Since it is so difficult to observe and measure a pastor's performance in specific activities, churches differentiate good pastors from mediocre ones by considering their total performance, rather than any specific activities.
机译:在多种情况下都可以观察到代理关系。与其他组织一样,教会也受到道德风险,可观察性,目标转移和规避风险等典型机构问题的困扰。教会在处理最关键的资源神职人员时如何应对这些问题?这项研究分析了教会与神职人员之间的代理关系。使用来自九个教派的数据,这项研究发现有力的证据表明牧师的薪酬并不直接与绩效挂钩,而是通过晋升比赛间接挂钩。成功的牧师会被召集到规模更大,可能更富裕,更有声望的会众中获得奖励。由于很难观察和衡量牧师在特定活动中的表现,因此教会通过考虑牧师的整体表现而不是任何特定活动来区分优秀牧师和普通牧师。

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