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The Coal Mine Mafia of India: A Mirror of Corporate Power

机译:印度煤矿黑手党:公司权力的一面镜子

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An investigation of the source of power of mafia-type organizations may reveal how other non-state actors can operate as if they are independent of the state. This study of the coal mafia in Dhanbad, India shows that power often derives from socially hierarchical relationships involving debt and/or caste. It also demonstrates how state policies that are thoughtlessly implemented may solidify existing hierarchies. By analogy, modern corporations gain some of their power by behaving as if they were semi-sovereign institutions that draw their strength informally from social networks and other extralegal relationships. The mafia in the Dhanbad coalfields emerged through a series of institutional changes. Labor shortages were initially resolved by labor intermediaries, who eventually controlled the labor through linkages associated with debt, caste, and social obligations. These intermediaries eventually assumed official positions in labor unions, which gave them a platform for electoral politics. When the coal industry was nationalized, the union leaders further solidified their position in the nationalized corporation. In this way, private labor intermediaries became local political leaders who controlled the state apparatus to some extent. Corporations follow similar patterns. Both mafias and corporations exploit weak governments, collude with them, and often operate with a high degree of independence. Like mafias, corporations often derive their power from socially embedded networks that they craft in local communities and populations. Because the roots of their influence are embedded in social networks, simple legal and regulatory changes are often insufficient to limit their power. Transnational corporations engaged in extraction of natural resources share with mafias the ability to leverage monopoly power in one domain into control of other domains. As a result, this case study of the coal mafia in India offers a unique entry point to understand corporate sovereignty.
机译:对黑手党型组织权力来源的调查可能会揭示其他非国家行为者如何像独立于国家一样运作。对印度丹巴德的煤炭黑手党的这项研究表明,权力通常来自涉及债务和/或种姓的社会等级关系。它还说明了若有所思地实施的州政策如何可以巩固现有层次结构。以此类推,现代公司的行为表现为好像是半主权机构,从社交网络和其他法外关系中非正式地汲取了力量,从而获得了部分权力。丹巴德煤田的黑手党是通过一系列制度变迁出现的。劳工短缺最初是由劳工中介机构解决的,后者最终通过与债务,种姓和社会义务相关的联系来控制劳工。这些中介最终在工会中担任正式职务,这为他们提供了选举政治的平台。煤炭行业国有化后,工会领导人进一步巩固了他们在国有企业中的地位。通过这种方式,私人劳资中介成为当地政治领袖,他们在某种程度上控制着国家机构。公司遵循类似的模式。黑手党和公司都利用软弱的政府,与它们勾结,并且通常以高度独立的方式运作。像黑手党一样,公司通常会从他们在当地社区和人口中建立的社交嵌入式网络中获取权力。由于其影响力的根源扎根于社交网络中,因此简单的法律和法规变更通常不足以限制其权力。从事自然资源开采的跨国公司与黑手党共享利用一个领域的垄断权控制其他领域的能力。因此,本案例以印度的黑手党为例,为理解企业主权提供了一个独特的切入点。

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