Exclusive Dealing and Entry, when Buyers Compete

摘要

For a long time, economists have been skeptical about the possibility that exclusive contracts could deter entry of a more efficient seller. This view is well summarized by the influential works of Richard A. Posner (1976) and Robert Bork (1978). They argue that, in order to induce a buyer to sign an exclusive deal, the incumbent should fully compensate it for the loss it suffers from not buying from a more efficient entrant. If buyers are final consumers, this loss amounts to the difference between the consumer surplus under entry and the consumer surplus under monopoly, an area which equals the monopoly profit plus the monopoly deadweight loss. Hence, the loss suffered by a buyer is higher than the profit the incumbent would make if entry were deterred. It follows that the incumbent would not find it profitable to foreclose entry, and that efficiency considerations, rather than anticompetitive motives, would explain the use of exclusive contracts.