Investment Behavior, Observable Expectations, and Internal Funds

摘要

Models derived from neoclassical fundamentals have often fared poorly in horseraces against ad hoc accelerator models of investment (see, e.g., Ben S. Bernanke et al., 1988). This result could reflect the consequences of asymmetric information in financial markets: lenders become more favorably inclined to provide funding when a firm's net worth improves, leading to an expansion of business investment. Hence, neoclassical fundamentals may have limited explanatory power because internal funds determine investment when firms face financing constraints. Consistent with this notion, Steven M. Fazzari et al. (1988) found that the firms classified as most likely to face financing constraints tended to have the greatest sensitivity of investment to cash flow. Subsequent empirical research has generally supported this finding (see R. Glenn Hubbard, 1998, for a review of the literature).