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Maintaining Equilibria During Exploration in Sponsored Search Auctions

机译:在赞助搜索拍卖中的探索过程中保持平衡

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摘要

We introduce an exploration scheme aimed at learning advertiser click-through rates in sponsored search auctions with minimal effect on advertiser incentives. The scheme preserves both the current ranking and pricing policies of the search engine and only introduces one set of parameters which control the rate of exploration. These parameters can be set so as to allow enough exploration to learn advertiser click-through rates over time, but also eliminate incentives for advertisers to alter their currently submitted bids. When advertisers have much more information than the search engine, we show that although this goal is not achievable, incentives to deviate can be made arbitrarily small by appropriately setting the exploration rate. Given that advertisers do not alter their bids, we bound revenue loss due to exploration.
机译:我们引入了一种探索方案,旨在在赞助的搜索拍卖中了解广告客户的点击率,并且对广告客户的激励影响最小。该方案既保留了搜索引擎的当前排名和定价政策,又仅引入了一组控制勘探速率的参数。可以设置这些参数,以便允许进行足够的探索以了解广告客户随时间的点击率,而且还消除了促使广告客户更改其当前提交的出价的动机。当广告商拥有比搜索引擎更多的信息时,我们表明尽管这个目标是无法实现的,但可以通过适当设置探索率来任意减小偏离的动机。鉴于广告客户不会更改其出价,我们将限制由于探索而产生的收入损失。

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