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On the Convergence of Multicast Games in Directed Networks

机译:有向网络中组播游戏的融合

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We investigate the convergence of the price of anarchy after a limited number of moves in the classical multicast communication game when the underlying communication network is directed. Namely, a subset of nodes of the network are interested in receiving the transmission from a given source node and can share the cost of the used links according to fixed cost sharing methods. At each step, a single receiver is allowed to modify its communication strategy, that is to select a communication path from the source, and assuming a selfish or rational behavior, it will make a best response move, that is it will select a solution yielding the minimum possible payment or shared cost. We determine lower and upper bounds on the price of anarchy, that is the highest possible ratio among the overall cost of the links used by the receivers and the minimum possible cost realizing the required communications, after a limited number of moves under the fundamental Shapley cost sharing method. In particular, assuming that the initial set of connecting paths can be arbitrary, we show an upper bound on the price of anarchy after 2 rounds, during each of which all the receivers move exactly once, and a matching lower bound, that we also extend to for any number k≥2 rounds, where r is the number of receivers. Similarly, exactly matching upper and lower bounds equal to r are determined for any number of rounds when starting from the empty state in which no path has been selected. Analogous results are obtained also with respect to other three natural cost sharing methods considered in the literature, that is the egalitarian, path-proportional and egalitarian-path proportional ones. Most results are also extended to the undirected case in which the communication links are bidirectional. Keywords Non-cooperative networks - Multicast games - Limited number of best-response moves - Price of anarchy - Shapley cost allocation A preliminary version of this work appeared in the Proceedings of the 19th Annual ACM Symposium on Parallel Algorithms and Architectures (SPAA), San Diego, California, USA, June 9–11, 2007
机译:我们研究了在定向基础通信网络时,在经典多播通信游戏中进行了有限的移动之后,无政府状态价格的收敛性。即,网络的节点的子集有兴趣从给定的源节点接收传输,并且可以根据固定的成本共享方法来共享所使用的链路的成本。在每个步骤中,都允许单个接收者修改其通信策略,即从源头选择通信路径,并假设自私或理性的行为,它将做出最佳响应,即选择解决方案最低可能的付款或共同费用。我们确定无政府状态价格的上限和下限,即在基本Shapley成本下进行了有限的移动之后,接收器使用的链路的总成本与实现所需通信的最小可能成本之间的最高可能比率共享方法。特别是,假设连接路径的初始集合可以是任意的,那么我们将在两轮之后显示无政府状态价格的上限,在每一轮中,所有接收者都只移动一次,并匹配下限,我们还将扩展对于任何数量的k≥2次回合,其中r是接收者的数量。类似地,当从没有选择路径的空状态开始时,对于任意数量的回合,都确定等于r的精确匹配的上下边界。对于文献中考虑的其他三种自然成本分摊方法,即均等,路径比例和均等-路径比例方法,也获得了类似的结果。大多数结果还扩展到通信链路是双向的无方向情况。关键字非合作网络-组播游戏-最佳响应动作数量有限-无政府状态价格-Shapley成本分配这项工作的初步版本出现在第19届ACM并行算法和体系结构年度研讨会论文集(SPAA),San 2007年6月9日至11日,美国加利福尼亚州迭戈

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