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Influence of contract commitment system in reducing information asymmetry and prevention and control of livestock epidemics: Evidence from pig farmers in China

机译:合同承诺制度对减少信息不对称的影响畜禽流行病的预防控制:来自猪农民的证据

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摘要

The prevention and control of infectious diseases in livestock is of great significance for maintaining the food and health of people. The main bottleneck in preventing and controlling the epidemic is asymmetrical information between farmers and the livestock department regarding dead livestock. In this pursuit, China has levied the contract commitment system to ensure farmers to cooperate with livestock departments, cooperative organizations, and other farmers by proper contract in order to combat the livestock epidemic by reporting the status of dead livestock on time. Based on the data of 514 pig farmers in Hebei, Henan, and Hubei, this research employed the Heckprobit model to explore the contract commitment system's effect on pig farmers' behavior in reporting the status of dead livestock. The outcome showed that the contract commitment system encouraged the farmers to report dead pig information promptly. Moreover, modern information channels such as mobile phones or the Internet further enhanced the contract commitment system's effectiveness. Besides, the impacts of the contract commitment system on different scale farmers are found substantially heterogeneous. Based on the empirical findings, it is confirmed that the contract commitment system should not exclude government regulatory measures and economic incentive policies. It is a useful remedy to encourage farmers to report dead livestock information on time and supports in preventing and controlling livestock epidemics. Additionally, the government should enhance and strengthen the contract commitment system, establish the channels and platforms required to deliver necessary information about epidemics, and implement differentiated policy programs for different scale farmers. More importantly, these countermeasures can also provide important guidelines for other developing countries, facing livestock epidemics.
机译:预防和控制牲畜的传染病对人们的食物和健康有着重要意义。预防和控制疫情的主要瓶颈是农民与牲畜部门有关死亡牲畜的不对称信息。在这种追求中,中国征收了合同承诺制度,以确保农民通过适当的合同与牲畜部门,合作组织和其他农民合作,以便通过报告最终的牲畜的地位对畜牧业流行进行打击。基于河北,河南和湖北514个猪农民的数据,本研究采用了Heckprobit模型,探讨了合同承诺制度对猪农民的行为报告死亡牲畜状况。结果表明,合同承诺制度鼓励农民及时向死猪信息报告死猪。此外,移动电话或互联网等现代信息渠道进一步增强了合同承诺系统的效率。此外,合同承诺制度对不同规模农民的影响基本上是异质的。根据实证调查结果,确认合同承诺制度不应排除政府监管措施和经济激励政策。鼓励农民准时报告死亡牲畜信息并支持预防和控制牲畜流行病的措施是一个有益的补救措施。此外,政府应加强和加强合同承诺制度,建立提供有关流行信息所需信息所需的渠道和平台,并为不同规模农民实施差异化政策计划。更重要的是,这些对策还可以为其他发展中国家提供重要指导方针,面临畜牧业流行病。

著录项

  • 期刊名称 One Health
  • 作者单位
  • 年(卷),期 2021(-1),-1
  • 年度 2021
  • 页码 -1
  • 总页数 9
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

    机译:牲畜流行病;信息不对称;合同承诺制度;信息报告;死猪;
  • 入库时间 2022-08-21 12:27:48

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