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Social Stratification and Cooperative Behavior in Spatial Prisoners Dilemma Games

机译:空间囚徒困境游戏中的社会分层与合作行为

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摘要

It has been a long-lasting pursuit to promote cooperation, and this study aims to promote cooperation via the combination of social stratification and the spatial prisoners’ dilemma game. It is previously assumed that agents share the identical payoff matrix, but the stratification or diversity exists and exerts influences in real societies. Thus, two additional classes, elites and scoundrels, derive from and coexist with the existing class, commons. Three classes have different payoff matrices. We construct a model where agents play the prisoners’ dilemma game with neighbors. It indicates that stratification and temptation jointly influence cooperation. Temptation permanently reduces cooperation; elites play a positive role in promoting cooperation while scoundrels undermine it. As the temptation getting larger and larger, elites play a more and more positive and critical role while scoundrels’ negative effect becomes weaker and weaker, and it is more obvious when temptation goes beyond its threshold.
机译:促进合作是一项长期的追求,本研究旨在通过社会分层和空间囚徒困境博弈的结合来促进合作。以前假设代理商共享相同的收益矩阵,但是存在分层或多样性并在实际社会中产生影响。因此,另外两个阶层,精英阶层和无赖阶层,是从现存的阶级共同体中衍生出来并与之共存的。三个类别具有不同的收益矩阵。我们构建了一个模型,在这个模型中,特工与邻居们玩囚徒的困境游戏。它表明,分层和诱惑共同影响合作。诱惑永久减少了合作;精英在促进合作中发挥了积极作用,而无赖破坏了合作。随着诱惑越来越大,精英们扮演着越来越积极和关键的角色,而ound徒的负面影响越来越弱,而当诱惑力超过极限时,这一点就更加明显。

著录项

  • 期刊名称 other
  • 作者

    Peng Lu; Xiaoping Zheng;

  • 作者单位
  • 年(卷),期 -1(10),7
  • 年度 -1
  • 页码 e0131005
  • 总页数 16
  • 原文格式 PDF
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