Despite more than thirty years of debate, disagreement persists among research ethicists about the most appropriate way to interpret the U.S. regulations on pediatric research, specifically the categories of “minimal risk” and a “minor increase over minimal risk.” Focusing primarily on the definition of “minimal risk,” we argue in this article that the continued debate about the pediatric risk categories is at least partly because their conceptual status is seldom considered directly. Once this is done, it becomes clear that the most popular strategy for interpreting “minimal risk”—defining it as a specific set of risks—is indefensible and, from a pragmatic perspective, unlikely to resolve disagreement. Primarily this is because judgments about minimal risk are both normative and heavily intuitive in nature and thus cannot easily be captured by reductions to a given set of risks. We suggest instead that a more defensible approach to evaluating risk should incorporate room for reflection and deliberation. This dispositional, deliberative framework can nonetheless accommodate a number of intellectual resources for reducing reliance on sheer intuition and improving the quality of risk evaluations.
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