【2h】

Husserlian Phenomenology as a Kind of Introspection

机译:胡塞尔现象学作为一种内省

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摘要

The thesis of this article is that Husserl's proposed method for intuitively exploring the essential or a priori laws of consciousness is a kind of introspection. After a first reflection on the meaning of “introspection,” four elements of Husserl's methodology are introduced: the principle of all principles, epoché, phenomenological reduction, and eidetic variation. These features are then individually related to six common features Eric Schwitzgebel mentions in his definition of introspection in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. The explanation of these elements is complemented by mentioning phenomenological insights they offer. It is thereby shown how Husserl's methodology evades some of the pitfalls of introspection and reaches a secure ground. Such pitfalls are: a relatively uncontrolled and varying scope of awareness, false prejudices, and problems distinguishing between idiosyncratic and general features of consciousness. As this article is written for the section Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, Husserl's approach is developed in relation to two well-known philosophical systems that considerably influenced him, Hume's and Kant's.
机译:本文的论点是,胡塞尔提出的直观地探索本质或先验意识定律的方法是一种内省。在对“内省”的含义进行了首次反思之后,胡塞尔的方法论的四个要素被引入:所有原理的原理,时代,现象学的还原和审美变异。然后,这些特征分别与埃里克·施维茨伯格在《斯坦福哲学百科全书》中对内省的定义中提到的六个共同特征相关。对这些元素的解释通过提及它们提供的现象学见解得到补充。由此可以看出,胡塞尔的方法是如何逃避内省的一些陷阱并达到稳固的基础。这样的陷阱是:意识的相对不受控制和变化的范围,错误的偏见以及区分意识的特质和一般特征的问题。正如本文在“理论和哲学心理学”部分所写的那样,胡塞尔的方法是针对休ume和康德这两个对他产生重大影响的著名哲学体系而发展起来的。

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