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博弈论视角下的产品质量安全问题研究

         

摘要

In recent years, the product quality and safety incidents frequently outbreak, for example the "Clenbuterol in pork", "dyed bread", "a drop of fragrant", "melamine". The quality and safety of product has become an important factor, which is affecting social harmony and stability, and constraining the rapid development of China's economy. In this paper, at first, study the papers and researches which are related to product quality and safety, then base on the game theory, to establish a complete information dynamic game model which is between businesses with consumers, for analyzing the strategies which businesses and consumers to maximize their own interests, and getting the Nash equilibrium outcome. At last, realize the arm that to find out the root causes of problem of product quality and safety, and provide the corresponding countermeasures.%近年来,我国频繁爆发产品质量安全事件,从“瘦肉精”、“染色馒头”到“一滴香”、“三聚氰胺”等,产品质量安全问题日益成为影响社会和谐与稳定的重要因素之一,阻碍和制约了我国经济的又好又快发展.本文首先梳理了产品质量安全相关的研究成果,随后从博弈论的角度出发,建立企业和消费者之间的完全信息动态博弈模型,分析企业和消费者为实现各自利益最大化而采取的策略,得出企业和消费者的纳什均衡结果.进而达到探寻产品质量安全产生根源,提出相应对策建议的目的.

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