企业创新与模仿的博弈分析

摘要

In this paper, by constructing game model of enterprise innovation choice of different innovation cost, replicator dynamics and evolutionary stable strategy of the general two symmetric and asymmetric game were discussed respectively, influence of government behavior on the choice of enterprise innovation was analyzed, and suggestions on how to promote China's technical innovation of enterprise and stabilize development of technical market.%本文通过构建不同创新成本的企业创新选择的博弈模型,分别讨论了一般两人对称与非对称博弈的复制动态和进化稳定策略,分析了政府行为对企业创新选择的影响,并对如何促进我国企业技术创新和稳定技术市场发展提出了自己的建议.