基于二阶段博弈的碳排放权分配机制研究

摘要

建立了政府和两企业之间的一主两从Stackelberg博弈模型和企业之间的差异Bertrand价格博弈模型，将两者结合成一个二阶段博弈模型。对政府和企业之间的博弈行为以及决策变量之间的关系进行分析。研究证明碳排放交易市场可以通过每个企业的边际减排成本均等化实现排放权最终的优化配置，而政府通过确定碳排放权的初始分配比例实现社会的公平性。最后通过数据分析了环境污染程度、企业的减排技术对在均衡条件下的企业效益、政府决策偏好和社会公平性的影响。%A Stackelberg game model between the government and two firms a country and Bertrand price game model with different commodities between the two firms in one country are established. And the combination of the two game models is a two stage game model. The game behavior of the government and two firms and the relationship between decision variables are analyzed. Carbon emissions trading market can achieve final optimized allocation by equalization of marginal costs of emission abatement. The government determines the initial carbon emission rights allocation ratio based on the fairness of society. Finally, the simulation of environmental data is analyzed. It proves that the level of pollution and abatement technology affect the firms benefits,government decision-making preferences and social equity indexes under equilibrium conditions.