弗雷格把语句的涵义看作思想，把语句的指称看作真值。本文接受弗雷格关于语句的涵义一指称的意义结构，但把语句的涵义和指称分别改为语法意义和事态。语句的真或假是语句和它所指称的事态之间的一种关系，类似于名称同它的指称对象之间的实一空关系。弗雷格关于思想的客观性转换为语法意义的客观性，体现为语言共同体成员的主体间性。本文区分了指称对象和指称意向，把指称意向定义为涵义和语境的结合，相当于弗雷格所说的判断。本文还对语句的语法意义和认识论意义作了区分。%Frege takes the sense of a sentence to be the thought and the reference to be its truth-value. I will adopt his schema of 'sense-reference' to analyze the meaning of a sentence, while understand the sense and reference of a sentence as the grammatical meaning and the state of affairs respectively. The truth or falsity of a sentence is a relation between the sentence and the corresponding state of affairs it refers to, which parallels the relation of non-emptiness or emptiness between a name and its referent. The objectivity of thought in Frege's framework is transformed into the objectivity of grammatical meaning, which is embodied in the intersubjectivity among the members of a linguistic community. I will distinguish the referent from referential intention, and stipulate the referential intention as the combination of the sense and the context, which amounts to Frege's term 'judgment'. I will differentiate the grammatical meaning and epistemological meaning of a sentence as well.
展开▼
