胡塞尔的数学哲学思想对于胡塞尔研究者来说一直是一个重要课题。然而，关于胡塞尔本人对该领域的观点究竟为何的争论始终悬而未决。针对该问题，现今有各种不同的诠释。本文旨在梳理该学术领域的研究现状。我提议从胡塞尔1906年左右著名的先验转向着手。正是对该转向的不同理解导致了当前诠释上的差异。公正地对待胡塞尔的先验转向也成了评价这些诠释的批判性标准。其中，我认为理查德・梯辛（ Richard Tieszen）提出的理论———“建构柏拉图主义（或建构实在论）”符合这一标准。它也就成为胡塞尔整体数学哲学思想的唯一可行的解读，我将会在后文中对此进行说明与辩护。在下文中，我将首先展示数学对象所特有的形而上学性质，即理念性（或抽象性，ideality， abstract），以及它与胡塞尔先验唯心论之间的张力；在第二与第三部分，我将分别对哈多克（ Haddock）的素朴柏拉图主义诠释及范・阿登（ van Atten）的直觉主义诠释进行批判；在第四部分，我将提出并论证梯辛的“建构柏拉图主义”诠释较其他诠释而言更加可行；最后，我将分析哈蒂莫（ Hartimo）最近提出的多元主义解读并给予拒斥。%This Paper discusses the current different interpretations of Husserl’s Philosophy of Mathematics.The point of departure of the different interpretations is how to understand Husserl’s turn to transcendental ideal-ism.The naive Platonic reading does not take the transcendental turn seri-ously and accordingly fails to explain how we can have mathematical knowl-edge; the intuitionistic reading understands transcendental idealism as a subjective solipsistic idealism, and thus fails to explain the ideal objectivity of mathematical entities.Constituted Platonism will be defended as the only successful interpretation, as it gives full justice to Husserl’s transcendental-ism, and understands mathematical objectivity as the accomplishment of constitutive consciousness.Finally, the pluralist reading is refuted in that it does not recognize the difference made by different meaning-intentions be-stowed by consciousness.
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