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The Groundlessness of Praxis in Wittgenstein’s On Certainty:Philosophy as a Transformation of Attitude

机译:维特根斯坦《确定论》中实践的无根据:哲学作为态度的转变

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In this paper,the transformative and critical potential of the groundlessness of praxis--a central issue in Wittgenstein’s On Certainty--is outlined.It argues that the groundlessness of human praxis entails neither a relativistic nor a foundationalistic epistemological position.On the contrary,following Stanley Cavell and a“resolute reading”of Wittgenstein’s philosophy,it claims that Wittgenstein’s aim is to let us acknowledge that both epistemological foundationalism and epistemic relativism are apparent needs,so as to invite us to change our practical way of acting.From this perspective,this paper suggests that Wittgenstein’s account of philosophy addresses the readers and involves a transformation of their own practical attitude and way of acting.
机译:In this paper,the transformative and critical potential of the groundlessness of praxis--a central issue in Wittgenstein’s On Certainty--is outlined.It argues that the groundlessness of human praxis entails neither a relativistic nor a foundationalistic epistemological position.On the contrary,following Stanley Cavell and a“resolute reading”of Wittgenstein’s philosophy,it claims that Wittgenstein’s aim is to let us acknowledge that both epistemological foundationalism and epistemic relativism are apparent needs,so as to invite us to change our practical way of acting.From this perspective,this paper suggests that Wittgenstein’s account of philosophy addresses the readers and involves a transformation of their own practical attitude and way of acting.

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