政府委托下应急物资代储系统激励契约设计

摘要

The agent emergency supplies reservation under government consigning is a common strategy of emergency supplies management,and the enterprise's effort plays an vital role in materials supply,but because the goals they pursue between government and enterprise are inconsistent,and the transparency of information is constrained by some objective conditions,enterprises are more likely to develop weariness emotion because of a long period of time in peace,or may pay less for pursuing economic benefit,so the total effort will decline,which brings potential risk to material supply in emergency.Hence,the article builds a game theory model between the enterprise and government by using supply chain contract theory,which analyzes the influence of the incentive method and incentive subsidy on the enterprise's efforts and searches for the optimal parameter settings through numerical stimulation.Then the paper designs an incentive contract on agent emergency supplies reservation system by making the corresponding rewards and punishment rule.Above all,the incentive contract has a great effect on the government in managing the enterprise efficiently.It also can stimulate the enterprise to improve its efforts,and what's more,the paper offers? theoretical support for promoting the emergency supplies capacity under the condition of emergencies.%政府委托企业代储应急物资是现实中普遍采用的一种应急物资管理策略,代储企业的努力程度对于保障应急物资的可靠供应具有关键性的作用,但由于代储企业与政府之间存在追求目标的差异,以及信息透明化方面受客观条件制约等因素,代储企业可能会因为长期的“太平无事”而产生倦怠,或者为追求经济效益而减少应有的付出,导致总体的努力程度下降,给应急条件下的物资供应带来隐患.鉴于此,论文采用供应链契约激励的理论,建立政企之间的利益博弈模型,分析政府的激励方式和激励数额对应急物资代储企业努力程度的影响,通过数值仿真寻找最优的参数设置,在此基础上,设计符合实际需要的应急物资代储激励契约,制定相应的奖惩规则,从而为政府有效管理应急物资代储企业,提高其努力程度,提升应急条件下应急物资供应保障能力提供了理论支撑.