基于公私不同风险偏好的PPP项目政府补偿机制研究

摘要

Considering the different risk preference between the public and the private,the government's compensation coordination mechanism of PPP project are respectively studied on the the centralization decision-making Stackelberg game and decentralization decision.The research results show that the private can not be induced to make a decision in accordance with optimization of whole project by a direct compensation in risk aversion model.Then a hybrid contract is proposed for this problem and government will share a part of construction investment in this contract.And the analysis shows that this contract can coordinate the centralization and decentralization decision when the proportion of government construction investment is suitable.Finally,a numerical analysis is presented to further illustrate the theoretical analysis results.%本文在考虑双方风险偏好差异的基础上,围绕PPP项目补偿问题构建了公私双方的Stackelberg博弈模型,从集中决策和分散决策协调的角度研究了PPP项目的补偿机制.研究表明,在公私双方存在风险厌恶时,直接补贴契约无法诱导私人投资者做出符合整体最优的决策.因此,本文设计了一种基于政府部分承担建设投资的混合补偿契约改进前补贴模式.分析表明,当建设投资分担比例合适时,混合补偿契约可以协调风险厌恶下的PPP补偿博弈的分散决策和集中决策,实现Pareto改进.最后,通过数值分析进一步研究了补偿契约的影响因素和适用范围.