基于不同奖惩机制项目支付进度优化:双重视角

摘要

奖惩机制会对合同双方的收益产生重大影响,本文基于承包商和业主的双重视角,对不同奖惩机制下项目支付进度优化问题进行了研究.首先对所研究问题进行界定,并分别基于承包商和业主视角构建了不同奖惩机制下的优化模型;基于模型的属性设计了模拟退火启发式算法;最后通过一个实例对比了承包商和业主在四种不同奖惩机制下收益的优化结果,并对其中的关键参数进行了敏感性分析.结果显示:不同的奖惩机制对承包商和业主的收益有较大影响;不同的奖惩强度也会影响承包商和业主的收益.通过对奖惩机制类型及强度的分析,可以为项目中奖惩机制的设置提供定量化决策支持.%Bonus-penalty structure has great effect on profits of both sides of contract,and this paper studies the project payment scheduling problem under different bonus-penalty structures from the prospective of contractor and client.Firstly,the author identifies the problem studied and constructs optimal model based on different bonus-penalty structures from the perspective of contractor and client respectively.Then,a simulated annealing heuristic is developed as for the problems'' characters.Ultimately,a practical instance is solved,and the profits of contractor and client under different bonus-penalty structures are compared.Moreover,a sensitive analysis is made.The results show that different bonus-penalty structures have great effect on profits of contractor and client,and different rates of bonus and penalty also affect contractor and client''s benefits.The study in this paper can provide a quantitative decision support for establishment of bonus-penalty structure in project.