学者们大多从意向性、构造、先验自我等前期概念出发来解释胡塞尔思想的发展。但这样的解读很难让我们把胡塞尔对区域本体论的研究成果整合进其思想发展的脉络。本文试图加入“世界”这一视角，丰富我们解读的可能性。在本文的第一部分，我们将扼要考察《逻辑研究》同世界现象的关联，并指出胡塞尔把世界纳入现象学论域的必要性。在第二部分，我们将处理《观念I》中先验还原与世界概念间的复杂关系，并指出《观念I》的理论架构在什么意义上使对世界现象的考察成为可能，又在哪些环节遮蔽了世界现象。在第三部分，我们基于意向活动－意向相关项框架详细分析《观念I》中的世界现象，并指出世界的引导作用和前期胡塞尔为我们留下的理论空间。%Scholars concerned usually interpret the development of Husserl’s thought through his early concepts,such as intention-ality,constitution,and transcendental ego.However,following this approach,it is quite difficult to integrate Husserl’s research of regional ontology into his whole frame of thought.This research attempts to add a perspective of“world”,which will enrich the possibility of interpreting Husserl.The first section briefly reviews the relationship between Logical Investigation and the phenome-non of the world,and indicates the necessity of studying world-phenomenon in phenomenology.The second section focuses on the complicated relationship between transcendental reduction and the concept of world in Ideas with an attempt to show in what sense the theoretical frame of Ideas I makes our investigation of world-phenomenon possible,and in what sense it conceals world-phe-nomenon.The third section analyzes world-phenomenon in Ideas I based on the noesis-noema frame,and tries to make explicit the theoretical space and approaches proposed by Husserl,which could help us go further into world-phenomenon.
展开▼
