安斯康姆曲线：意向性行动与身心整体论

摘要

Anscombe insists that intention is a feature rather than a property of an intentional action . This claim distinguishes her understanding of action essentially from that of Davidson ,who holds a‘nomological’ view of interpretation . M . Thomson attributes this difference to their different understanding of ‘event’ ,‘action’ and‘deed’ ,w hile I think it is due to their different ontological commitments .This paper intends to show that it is only within the framework of mind‐body holism that Anscombe’s contribution to the philosophy of action as well as to contemporary cognitive study can be properly appreciated .%安斯康姆认为，意向是意向性行动的特征而不是它的属性，斯多特兰德和洪斯贝将此视为安斯康姆与戴维森在行动理论上的重要差异。安斯康姆拒绝以“法则论”来解释意向性行动，她试图以一种独特的追问来展现它是什么。汤姆普森注意到了安斯康姆式例子与戴维森式例子在形式上的不同，但是他忽略了这个差别的根源，即二者不同的本体论承诺：戴维森派从根本上讲仍是笛卡尔主义的，而安斯康姆是反笛卡尔主义和反还原论的。安斯康姆关于意向性行动的思想及其对心智研究的贡献只有在身心整体论的立场上才能得到充分的理解。这个身心整体论不仅在语言建构上是可能的，而且在语用上也是简便的。