首页> 中文期刊>北京工业大学学报(社会科学版) >地方政府污染治理与公众环境抗争的行动逻辑--基于博弈的分析框架

地方政府污染治理与公众环境抗争的行动逻辑--基于博弈的分析框架

     

摘要

地方政府在环境污染治理中的矛盾局面是导致环境抗争群体性事件不断涌现、升级的根源。对待潜在的或者已有的环境污染侵害行为是采取行动还是保持沉默,地方政府与公众之间因角色的不同而采取着不同的行动策略。文章从博弈论的视角分析了地方政府与公众在环境污染治理中的行动逻辑,认为地方政府未来环境污染防治政策改革的首要任务是突破复杂的利益纠葛,将公众的环境诉求纳入污染治理决策。%The root of the group events in the environmental protest, whichbecome increasingly tough was the contradiction situation of the local governments in the environmental pollution control. Because of the different roles between the local government and the public, they have to take different action strategies about the potential or existing environmental pollution. The article analyzed the action logic of the local government and public in the environmental pollution control from the Game Theory, and the author believes that the primary task in the future environmental pollution prevention is that the public demands in the environmental pollution control decisions should be included when considering the complex conflicting interests.

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